The report recommends instead that solution

The liberalisation of the electricity sector has been accompanied, in France of coexistence between two prices for the final consumer: a system of "regulated price" which remain essentially wedged on the cost of production of the national electricity (78 nuclear and 12) hydraulic and enjoyed by consumers who did not play the eligibility, and a system of "market offer price" following the European wholesale market prices and whose benefit consumers who have been playing eligibility. Wholesale prices are considerably higher than the regulated prices because they follow the cost of production of thermal electricity produced with coal and gas and the price of this gas as coal are indexed or correlated with the price of oil. The interconnection of the wholesale markets for electricity in Europe (at least between the France, the Germany and the Benelux countries) is that it is often the cost of production of a thermal power station fuelled with gas or coal, German in General, which "is the price" in the market. French nuclear power is "marginal" therefore "price maker" that 20 to 25 of the time; It would be 50 of the time if the France living in autarky. A nuclear. This reasoning is not correct.

There is a "nuclear annuity" if and only if the average sales price of the nuclear kWh is greater than the full cost (fixed and variable costs) for the production of this kWh, normal rate of return on invested capital included. To sell the nuclear kWh to the price per kWh "coal" or "gas" in the hours of the year (full hour or peak hour) is not an undue annuity because it is at this time that EDF retrieves the fixed costs of nuclear power plants. When nuclear power is "marginal", the kWh is sold on the basis of only variable costs of nuclear power: it is the logic of the pricing at marginal cost which everyone knows that it is optimal for a class point of view.

Moreover this nuclear annuity, where it exists, is not the result of a any "market power" EDF but must be regarded as a "scarcity rent." It is because other European countries, the Germany, did not quite invested in nuclear power, average less expensive, that one is forced to use conventional thermal plants a large part of the time and this is the result of simple political constraints.

At the time competitors to EDF on the French market, and lack the advantage of this nuclear, are struggling to compete with EDF and that bothers the Brussels Commission, which notes that EDF WINS foreign market share while the reciprocal is true or whether it is to the same degree. These competitors may not build nuclear power plants currently in France and their "sourcing" is either the kWh purchased on the wholesale market is the kWh produced with a conventional thermal power (than those who have access to water). The question then is whether how promote competition without obliging EDF to sell some of its plants and allowing French consumers to benefit from this "comparative advantage" that is a cheap nuclear power. The commission Paul Champsaur was precisely to make practical proposals to reconcile these somewhat conflicting objectives.

The Champsaur report proposes 2 solutions: either State ownership to 85 of the capital of EDF, retrieves the annuity through a tax that would be assigned to the modernisation of distribution networks or could be redistributed to French consumers via a negative sort of "cspe." either we allow competitors to EDF to obtain a "sourcing" with EDF via a "regulated price" of access to historical nuclear power, which would be less than the price observed in the wholesale electricity market. The report recommends instead that solution. It is not "dismantle" nuclear power and can certainly wonder about legitimacy there to benefit its competitors an advantage that is has acquired as a result of good decisions in the past... It should be noted that the report emphasizes three key points:

-This access would be transitory; It is to increase the market share of competitors so it can no longer charge EDF to be in a dominant position and abuse;

-This access would be restricted to only French customers; It is not be given to consumers in countries who refuse to nuclear power, but this provision may face the refusal of the judge who may see a "destination clause", which is contrary to European law;

-but this historic nuclear redemption price cannot be too low and must incorporate a normal rate of return on invested capital; It is conceivable that this price of redemption (set by an independent commission) is stalled on a smoothed average prices observed in the base or semi-base on the wholesale market; It may also require compensation on the part of those who would benefit from the system. For example could compel them to commit themselves to invest in means of production of advanced...

It is on the basis of this report that the said Bill "Nome" (new organization of the electricity market) is being drafted; but EDF today no longer seems to accept such a system, and some believe that the limit Company prefer sell at auction a few nuclear power plants, this raises other issues. It should be noted however that it is the State that decides in fine and that the prospects of building new reactors are more today than in England, Italy, or even in Germany instead of France, in the short or medium term at least. The French public company is strongly present on these markets. Tomorrow, all operators will be able to invest in the EPR of most mass way everywhere in Europe. This report very criticized today, has the merit of a real question of the effects of the opening to competition, and the advantage to propose practical solutions which, as any compromise, really satisfy anyone. The debate remains open... and it will certainly be in Parliament next spring.