However the threat to anchor in an interaction

The tension currently surrounding the Iranian nuclear file is reflected by the use of threats in the negotiation. The question of sanctions is raised again to Foreign Ministers of the G8 meeting yesterday and the Canada today. Robert Gibbs, spokesman for the White House, clearly threatened the Iran there is a little by saying that the behavior of the Iran "would have consequences if it continued. But one wonders if this new use of threats in the negotiation is the most effective strategy.

The threats are a widely used by the negotiators. Empirical observation suggests that the threats can positively affect the outcome of a negotiation. However, the threat to anchor in an interaction. The dynamics of the interaction itself makes it more or less effective threat. A priori, the American position appears as the logical conclusion of the negotiation process began late September in Geneva when the 5 1 (members of the Security Council of the United Nations and the Germany) were developed in agreement with the Iran that Iranian uranium enriched abroad. The idea is that the United States went after what they could do. It was to persuade the Iran that this offer is the last. For the United States, if the Iran, at this stage, said no, he loses any possibility of an agreement with the United States. The "take it or leave it" is often effective in bargaining.

But he is not sure that this reasoning is flawless. Negotiation is a form of mutual interaction between the players. However the effectiveness of a strategy of threat is real if the interaction has really taken place. In this case, the psychological cost of not reaching an agreement increases with time. It would be indeed more difficult for the Iran break a negotiation, once he is involved in it, has deployed energy, time and thought in the process. Or is it in this case Account of thirty years of creeping war between the Iran and the United States, from 1979 to 2009, can we consider that negotiations have truly begun between the Iran and the United States The answer is clearly no. A few statements of Obama showing his absence of hostility the population and the Iran regime and the negotiation of Geneva on 30 September 2009, are not a real negotiation. In this context, the use of explicit threats, while the time for negotiation has been very short, may have the effect of strengthening the opposition of the part of the Iran who suffers sanctions for thirty years and the national consciousness is built by the resistance to the foreign invader. It is this scheme which had led to the failure of Iranian strategy of the previous US administration threatening without even wanting to negotiate. Research also shows that increase the power of an actor, therefore absolute ability to issue threats, can lead to objectively less good results for him, all things being equal. This is a counterproductive threat perverse effect when it is used in a reckless manner.

Should understand the hesitation and contradictions of the Iranian position are quite rational. As a first step, the Iran accepted the agreement in Geneva but, back in Tehran, this agreement has been criticized on any part, whether by opponents reformers as Mir Hossein Mousavi (who did not diplomatic to Ahmadinejad success) but also by the most radical of the conservatives (who worried that the Iran gave all his stock of low-enriched uranium abroad). Subsequently, the internal political crisis was that it was difficult to find a consensus. Moreover, the apparent volte-face of the Iranian President, who first announced that it is prepared to negotiate and then that it is enriching uranium to 20 does not necessarily mean that the Iran does not want to negotiate. It is explained by the context of domestic politics, it was the 31 anniversary of the revolution, but also by the cultural specificities of a mode of negotiation where advance to prepare the conditions for a satisfaisant decline The use of the threat risk to be ineffective in reaching a solution on Iran. Negotiation, for example integrating emerging countries (Brazil, Turkey, Korea South, etc.), remains the only way.